Som man kan se af nedenstående artikel har DF tydeligvis ikke gjort sig nogen som helst tanker om, hvad det er, de støtter, når de ikke vil anerkende Kosovo - eller har de? Kan man forestille sig, at den overvejende muslimske befolkning i Kosovo er sidste nye skud på stammen i DF s kampagne for et muslimfrit Europa? En afskyelig og grotesk agenda, når man ser beskrivelsen af, hvad det egentlig er, som DF reelt (måske uvidende) støtter. Man kan så spørge sig selv om folkemordet på Balkan er  fortid eller fremtid, hvis det stod til Dansk Folkeparti.

 
Vojislav Kostunica – Milosevic’s Opponent or Successor?

Kostunica Milosevics opponent or successor
http://jp.dk/indland/indland_politik/article1196907.ece
http://www.sydneypsychoanalysis.asn.au/                
http://www.american-pictures.com/gallery/            

"Time collapse

Time collapse is the term I use to denote the conscious and unconscious connections between past trauma and contemporary threat that typically emerge when a chosen trauma is drastically reactivated (Volkan, 1997, 1999a, 1999b). The reactivation of shared anxieties, expectations, fantasies, and defenses associated with the chosen trauma naturally magnifies the image of the current enemies and current conflicts. If the large group is now in a powerful position, the sense of revenge may become exaggerated, even ennobled. If the large group is in a powerless position, a current event may reanimate a shared sense of victimization. Time collapse may lead to irrational and sadistic or masochistic decision-making by the leadership of a large group; in turn, members of the large group may become psychologically prepared for sadistic or masochistic acts, and, in the worst case scenario, perpetrate otherwise monstrous cruelty against others. The conscious and unconscious aim of such decisions and acts is to protect the group s shared identity (Volkan, et al., 1998). The history of ethnic Serbs in the late 1980s and early 1990s provides a prime example of such time-collapsed chosen trauma reactivation.

After becoming independent from Byzantium in the 12th century, the Kingdom of Serbia thrived for almost 200 years under the leadership of the Nemanjic dynasty reaching its zenith under the beloved Emperor Stefan Dušan. After Dušan died in 1355, the Nemanjic dynasty soon came to an end. In 1371, Serb feudal lords elected Lazar Hrebeljanovic as leader of Serbia, although he assumed the title of prince rather than tzar. The decline of Serbia that followed his ascension to power is primarily attributed to the expansion of the Ottoman Empire into Serb territory, culminating in the Battle of Kosovo on June 28, 1389, at the Kosovo Polje (“Field of the Black Birds”) in Kosovo.

There are various versions of the "historical truth" of the Battle of Kosovo (Emmert, 1990). We know that the leaders of both warring groups were killed and that Lazar s body was canonized and mummified. Later, the mummified remains of Lazar were moved from a monastery near the battleground to a safer location north of Belgrade as the Ottomans consolidated their control over Serb territory. During this same period, the Battle of Kosovo, which had begun earlier to evolve into a chosen trauma for the Serb people, truly crystallized into a most important ethnic marker. Mythologized tales of the battle and Prince Lazar were passed from generation to generation through the strong Serbian oral and religious tradition, perpetuating and reinforcing Serbs traumatized self-images (Emmert, 1990; Lazarovich-Hrebelianovich and Calhoun, 1910; Markovic, 1983; Volkan, 1997, 1999a).

As the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo was approaching in April of 1987, Slobadan Miloševic, president of present-day Yugoslavia (the Serb-Montenegro federation) and then a Communist bureaucrat, was attending a meeting of 300 party delegates in Kosovo. At the time, only 10 percent of the population in Kosovo were Serbian; the majority were Albanian Muslims. During the meeting, a crowd of Serbs and Montenegrins tried to force their way into the meeting hall to voice grievances about the hardships they were experiencing in Kosovo. The local police blocked and prohibited their entrance. At that moment, Miloševic stepped forward and exclaimed: Nobody, either now or in the future, has the right to beat you.” Enraptured by the drama of the moment, the crowd became frenzied and spontaneously began to sing “Hej Sloveni,” the national anthem, and shouted, We want freedom We will not give up Kosovo This response in turn excited Miloševic; he remained in the building until dawn – a 13-hour period – to listen to tales of Serb victimization at the hands of Kosovo Muslims. Miloševic emerged from this experience a transformed leader, clad in the armor of Serb nationalism. He would later declare in a speech that Serbs in Kosovo are not a minority since Kosovo is Serbia and will always be Serbia.

One story in particular illustrates how Miloševic, with the help of some academics and the Serbian Church, reactivated the Serbian chosen trauma, empowering Serb nationalism. In 1889, the 500th anniversary of Kosovo, plans for moving Prince Lazar s mummified body back to the Kosovo region were discussed, but never came to fruition. As the 600th anniversary approached, Miloševic, together with others in his political circle, and with the blessing of the Serbian Orthodox Church, were determined to bring Lazar s body out of exile. Soon thereafter, the mummified remains of the legendary leader of the Serbs were placed in a coffin and taken on tour to every Serb village and town, where it was met by throngs of mourners dressed in black along with church leaders dressed in their religious garb. Serbs began to feel the effects of the collapse of 600 years into the present. As they greeted Lazar s body, they cried and wailed and solemnly vowed in speeches never to allow such a defeat to occur again. The “tour” of Lazar’s body functioned, in essence, as a daily reincarnation and reburial of the medieval prince.

In reactivating Serbs’ mental image of Lazar, Miloševic apparently made space for the group to grieve his (and its) defeat at the Battle of Kosovo at last, enabling the reversal of helplessness, humiliation, and shame. Mourners appeared to feel afresh affects appropriate to traumatized self-images, bonding the modern-day Serbs more closely together; individual Serbs’ self-images became suffused with a new sense of common entitlement for revenge. It is uncertain whether Miloševic intended to generate this response; whether intentional or not, however, the reactivation of the Serbs chosen trauma clearly played a significant role in creating the atmosphere in which atrocities against Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), and later against Kosovar Albanians (also Muslims), could take place, since Serbs have historically perceived both Bosniaks and Albanians as extensions of the Ottomans (for a more detailed account of the Serbs chosen trauma and its reactivation see Volkan, 1997,1999a)."

Summary:
"A comprehensive understanding of conflicts between large (i.e., ethnic) groups must always include a psychological dimension. This paper explores concepts of individual and large-group identity, their inherent connection and, in particular, focuses on “chosen trauma.” Chosen trauma refers to the shared mental representation of a past historical event during which a large group suffered losses and humiliation at the hands of an enemy group. Because of the enormity of the trauma, group members are left with psychological wounds and humiliation that they pass down from one generation to the next. Subsequent generations are given tasks such as mourning losses and reversing humiliation. Since these tasks are shared by most members of the group, the mental representation of the original trauma becomes a marker of the group’s identity. During times of radical change in a large-group’s history, and amid the large-group regression that characterizes such periods, political leaders tend to reactivate chosen traumas. This reactivation, in turn, may become fuel to ignite further the existing large-group conflicts."